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ABSTRACT
Many modern databases include personal and sensitive cor-
related data, such as private information on users connected
together in a social network, and measurements of physical
activity of single subjects across time. However, differential
privacy, the current gold standard in data privacy, does not
adequately address privacy issues in this kind of data.
This work looks at a recent generalization of differential
privacy, called Pufferfish, that can be used to address privacy
in correlated data. The main challenge in applying Pufferfish
is a lack of suitable mechanisms. We provide the first mech-
anism – the Wasserstein Mechanism – which applies to any
general Pufferfish framework. Since this mechanism may be
computationally inefficient, we provide an additional mech-
anism that applies to some practical cases such as physical
activity measurements across time, and is computationally
efficient. Our experimental evaluations indicate that this
mechanism provides privacy and utility for synthetic as well
as real data in two separate domains.
CCS Concepts
•Security and privacy → Privacy protections;
Keywords
privacy, differential privacy, Pufferfish privacy
1. INTRODUCTION
Modern database applications increasingly involve per-
sonal data, such as healthcare, financial and user behavioral
information, and consequently it is important to design algo-
rithms that can analyze sensitive data while still preserving
privacy. For the past several years, differential privacy [8]
has emerged as the gold standard in data privacy, and there
is a large body of work on differentially private algorithm
design that apply to a growing number of queries [16, 22, 4,
31, 23, 32, 17, 5, 34]. The typical setting in these works is
that each (independently drawn) record is a single individ-
ual’s private value, and the goal is to answer queries on a
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collection of records while adding enough noise to hide the
evidence of the participation of a single individual in the
data.
Many modern database applications, such as those involv-
ing healthcare, power usage and building management, also
increasingly involve a different setting – correlated data –
privacy issues in which are not as well-understood. Consider,
for example, a simple time-series application – measurement
of physical activity of a single subject across time. The goal
here is to release aggregate statistics on the subject’s activi-
ties over a long period (say a week) while hiding the evidence
of an activity at any specific instant (say, 10:30am on Jan
4). If the measurements are made at small intervals, then
the records form a highly correlated time-series as human
activities change slowly over time.
What is a good notion of privacy for this example? Since
the data belongs to a single subject, differential privacy is
not directly applicable; however, a modified version called
entry-privacy [15] applies. Entry-privacy ensures that the
inclusion of a single time-series entry does not affect the
probability of any outcome by much. It will add noise with
standard deviation ≈ 1 to each bin of the histogram of ac-
tivities. While this is enough for independent activities, it is
insufficient to hide the evidence of correlated activities that
may continue for several time points. A related notion is
group differential privacy [9], which extends the definition
to participation of entire groups of correlated individuals or
entries. Here, all entries are correlated, and hence group
differential privacy will add ≈ O(T ) noise to a histogram
over T measurements, thus destroying all utility. Thus to
address privacy challenges in this kind of data, we need a
different privacy notion.
A generalized version of differential privacy called Puffer-
fish was proposed by [20]. In Pufferfish, privacy require-
ments are specified through three components – S, a set of
secrets that represents what may need to be hidden, Q, a
set of secret pairs that represents pairs of secrets that need
to be indistinguishable to the adversary and Θ, a class of
distributions that can plausibly generate the data. Privacy
is provided by ensuring that the secret pairs in Q are indis-
tinguishable when data is generated from any θ ∈ Θ. In the
time-series example, S is the set of activities at each time
t, and secret pairs are all pairs of the form (Activity a at
time t, Activity b at time t). Assuming that activities tran-
sition in a Markovian fashion, Θ is a set of Markov Chains
over activities. Pufferfish captures correlation in such ap-
plications effectively in two ways – first, unlike differential
privacy, it can hide private values against correlation across
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multiple entries/individuals; second, unlike group privacy, it
also allows utility in cases where a large number of individ-
uals or entries are correlated, yet the “average amount” of
correlation is low.
Because of these properties, we adopt Pufferfish as our
privacy definition. To bolster the case for Pufferfish, we
provide a general result showing that even if the adversary’s
belief θ˜ lies outside the class Θ, the resulting loss in privacy
is low if θ˜ is close to Θ.
The main challenge in using Pufferfish is a lack of suitable
mechanisms. While mechanisms are known for specific in-
stantiations [20, 18, 35], there is no mechanism for general
Pufferfish. In this paper, we provide the first mechanism,
called the Wasserstein Mechanism, that can be adopted to
any general Pufferfish instantiation. Since this mechanism
may be computationally inefficient, we consider the case
when correlation between variables can be described by a
Bayesian network, and the goal is to hide the private value
of each variable. We provide a second mechanism, called
the Markov Quilt Mechanism, that can exploit properties
of the Bayesian network to reduce the computational com-
plexity. As a case study, we derive a simplified version of
the mechanism for the physical activity measurement exam-
ple. We provide privacy and utility guarantees, establish
composition properties, and finally demonstrate the prac-
tical applicability of the mechanism through experimental
evaluation on synthetic as well as real data. Specifically,
our contributions are as follows:
• We establish that when we guarantee Pufferfish pri-
vacy with respect to a distribution class Θ, but the
adversary’s belief θ˜ lies outside Θ, the resulting loss in
privacy is small when θ˜ is close to Θ.
• We provide the first mechanism that applies to any
Pufferfish instantiation and is a generalization of the
Laplace mechanism for differential privacy. We call
this the Wasserstein Mechanism.
• Since the above mechanism may be computationally
inefficient, we provide a more efficient mechanism called
the Markov Quilt Mechanism when correlation between
entries is described by a Bayesian Network.
• We show that under certain conditions, applying the
Markov Quilt Mechanism multiple times over the same
database leads to a gracefully decaying privacy param-
eter. This makes the mechanism particularly attrac-
tive as Pufferfish privacy does not always compose [20].
• We derive a simplified and computationally efficient
version of this mechanism for time series applications
such as physical activity monitoring.
• Finally, we provide an experimental comparison be-
tween Markov Quilt Mechanism and standard base-
lines as well as some concurrent work [14]; experiments
are performed on simulated data, a moderately-sized
real dataset (≈ 10, 000 observations per person) on
physical activity, and a large dataset (over 1 million
observations) on power consumption.
1.1 Related Work
There is a body of work on differentially private mech-
anisms [28, 27, 4, 3, 7] – see surveys [30, 9]. As we ex-
plain earlier, differential privacy is not the right formalism
for the kind of applications we consider. A related frame-
work is coupled-worlds privacy [2]; while it can take data
distributions into account through a distribution class Θ, it
requires that the participation of a single individual or en-
try does not make a difference, and is not suitable for our
applications. We remark that while mechanisms for specific
coupled-worlds privacy frameworks exist, there is also no
generic coupled-worlds privacy mechanism.
Our work instead uses Pufferfish, a recent generalization
of differential privacy [20]. [20, 18] provide some specific in-
stances of Pufferfish frameworks along with associated pri-
vacy mechanisms; they do not provide a mechanism that
applies to any Pufferfish instance, and their examples do
not apply to Bayesian networks. [35] uses a modification of
Pufferfish, where instead of a distribution class Θ, they con-
sider a single generating distribution θ. They consider the
specific case where correlations can be modeled by Gaussian
Markov Random Fields, and thus their work also does not
apply to our physical activity monitoring example. [24] de-
signs Pufferfish privacy mechanisms for distribution classes
that include Markov Chains. Their mechanism adds noise
proportional to a parameter ρ that measures correlation be-
tween entries. However, they do not specify how to calcu-
late ρ as a function of the distribution class Θ, and as a
result, their mechanism cannot be implemented when only
Θ is known. [33] releases time-varying location trajecto-
ries under differential privacy while accounting for tempo-
ral correlations using a Hidden Markov Model with publicly
known parameters. Finally, [19] apply Pufferfish to smart-
meter data; instead of directly modeling correlation through
Markov models, they add noise to the wavelet coefficients of
the time series corresponding to different frequencies.
In concurrent work, [14] provide an alternative algorithm
for Pufferfish privacy when data can be written as X =
(X1, . . . , Xn) and the goal is to hide the value of each Xi.
Their mechanism is less general than the Wasserstein Mech-
anism, but applies to a broader class of models than the
Markov Quilt Mechanism. In Section 5, we experimentally
compare their method with ours for Markov Chains and
show that our method works for a broader range of dis-
tribution classes than theirs.
Finally, there has also been some previous work on differ-
entially private time-series release [25, 13, 29]; however, they
relate to aggregates over trajectories from a large number of
people, unlike trajectories of single subjects as in our work.
2. THE SETTING
To motivate our privacy framework, we use two applica-
tions – physical activity monitoring of a single subject and
flu statistics in a social network. We begin by describing
them at a high level, and provide more details in Section 2.1.
Example 1: Physical Activity Monitoring. The database
consists of a time-series X = {X1, X2, . . . , XT } where record
Xt denotes a discrete physical activity (e.g, running, sitting,
etc) of a subject at time t. Our goal is to release (an approx-
imate) histogram of activities over a period (say, a week),
while preventing an adversary from inferring the subject’s
activity at a specific time (say, 10:30am on Jan 4).
Example 2: Flu Status. The database consists of a set
of records X = {X1, . . . , Xn}, where record Xi, which is 0
or 1, represents person i’s flu status. The goal is to release
(an approximation to)
∑
iXi, the number of infected peo-
ple, while ensuring privacy against an adversary who wishes
to detect whether a particular person Alice in the database
has flu. The database includes people who interact socially,
and hence the flu statuses are highly correlated. Addition-
ally, the decision to participate in the database is made at
a group-level (for example, workplace-level or school-level),
so individuals do not control their participation.
2.1 The Privacy Framework
The privacy framework of our choice is Pufferfish [20], an
elegant generalization of differential privacy [8]. A Pufferfish
framework is instantiated by three parameters – a set S of
secrets, a set Q ⊆ S × S of secret pairs, and a class of data
distributions Θ. S is the set of possible facts about the
database that we might wish to hide, and could refer to a
single individual’s private data or part thereof. Q is the set
of secret pairs that we wish to be indistinguishable. Finally,
Θ is a set of distributions that can plausibly generate the
data, and controls the amount and nature of correlation.
Each θ ∈ Θ represents a belief an adversary may hold about
the data, and the goal of the privacy framework is to ensure
indistinguishability in the face of these beliefs.
Definition 2.1. A privacy mechanism M is said to be -
Pufferfish private in a framework (S,Q,Θ) if for all θ ∈
Θ with X drawn from distribution θ, for all secret pairs
(si, sj) ∈ Q, and for all w ∈ Range(M), we have
e− ≤ PM,θ(M(X) = w|si, θ)
PM,θ(M(X) = w|sj , θ) ≤ e
 (1)
when si and sj are such that P (si|θ) 6= 0, P (sj |θ) 6= 0.
Readers familiar with differential privacy will observe that
unlike differential privacy, the probability in (1) is with re-
spect to the randomized mechanism and the actual data X,
which is drawn from a θ ∈ Θ; to emphasize this, we use the
notation X instead of D.
2.1.1 Properties of Pufferfish
An alternative interpretation of (1) is that for X ∼ θ,
θ ∈ Θ, for all (si, sj) ∈ Q, and for all w ∈ Range(M), we
have:
e− · P (si|θ)
P (sj |θ) ≤
P (si|M(X) = w, θ)
P (sj |M(X) = w, θ) ≤ e
 · P (si|θ)
P (sj |θ) . (2)
In other words, knowledge of M(X) does not affect the pos-
terior ratio of the likelihood of si and sj , compared to the
initial belief.
[20] shows that Differential Privacy is a special case of
Pufferfish, where S is the set of all facts of the form six =
Person i has value x for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and x in a domain
X , Q is set of all pairs (six, siz) for x and z in X with x 6= z,
and Θ is the set of all distributions where each individual is
distributed independently. Moreover, we cannot have both
privacy and utility when Θ is the set of all distributions [20].
Consequently, it is essential to select Θ wisely; if Θ is too
restrictive, then we may not have privacy against legitimate
adversaries, and if Θ is too large, then the resulting privacy
mechanisms may have little utility.
Finally, Pufferfish privacy does not always compose [20]
– in the sense that the privacy guarantees may not decay
gracefully as more computations are carried out on the same
data. However, some of our privacy mechanisms themselves
have good composition properties – see Section 4.3 for more
details.
A related framework is Group Differential Privacy [9],
which applies to databases with groups of correlated records.
Definition 2.2 (Group Differential Privacy). Let
D be a database with n records, and let G = {G1, . . . , Gk}
be a collection of subsets Gi ⊆ {1, . . . , n}. A privacy mech-
anism M is said to be -group differentially private with re-
spect to G if for all Gi in G, for all pairs of databases D
and D′ which differ in the private values of the individuals
in Gi, and for all S ⊆ Range(M), we have:
P (M(D) ∈ S) ≤ eP (M(D′) ∈ S).
In other words, Definition 2.2 implies that the partici-
pation of each group Gi in the dataset does not make a
substantial difference to the outcome of mechanism M .
2.2 Examples
We next illustrate how instantiating these examples in
Pufferfish would provide effective privacy and utility.
Example 1: Physical Activity Measurement. Let A
be the set of all activities – for example, {walking, running,
sitting} – and let sta denote the event that activity a occurs
at time t – namely, Xt = a. In the Pufferfish instantiation,
we set S as {sta : t = 1, . . . , T, a ∈ A} – so the activity at
each time t is a secret. Q is the set of all pairs (sta, stb) for
a, b in A and for all t; in other words, the adversary cannot
distinguish whether the subject is engaging in activity a or
b at any time t for all pairs a and b. Finally, Θ is a set of
time series models that capture how people switch between
activities. A plausible modeling decision is to restrict Θ to
be a set of Markov Chains X1 → X2 → . . . → XT where
each state Xt is an activity in A. Each such Markov Chain
can be described by an initial distribution q and a transition
matrix P . For example, when there are three activities, Θ
can be the set:{10
0
 ,
0.1 0.5 0.40.4 0.3 0.3
0.3 0.3 0.4
 ,
01
0
 ,
0.9 0.1 0.00.0 0.9 0.1
0.1 0.0 0.9
}.
In this example,
• Differential privacy does not directly apply since we
have a single person’s data.
• Entry differential privacy [15, 20] and coupled worlds
privacy [2] add noise with standard deviation ≈ 1/
to each bin of the activity histogram. However, this
does not erase the evidence of an activity at time t.
Moreover, an activity record does not have its agency,
and hence its not enough to hide its participation.
• As all entries are correlated, group differential privacy
adds noise with standard deviation ≈ T/, where T is
the length of the chain; this destroys all utility.
In contrast, in Section 4 we show an -Pufferfish mechanism
which will add noise approximately equal to the mixing time
over , and thus offer both privacy and utility for rapidly
mixing chains.
Example 2: Flu Status over Social Network. Let si0
(resp. si1) denote the event that person i’s flu status is 0
(resp. 1). In the Pufferfish instantiation, we let S be the set
{si0, si1 : i = 1, . . . , n} – so the flu status of each individual
is a secret. Q is {(si0, si1) : i = 1, . . . , n} – so the adversary
cannot tell if each person i has flu or not. Θ is a set of
models that describe the spread of flu; a plausible θ ∈ Θ is
a tuple (Gθ, pθ) where Gθ = (X,E) is a graph of personal
interactions, and pθ is a probability distributions over the
connected components of Gθ. As a concrete example, Gθ
could be an union of cliques C1, . . . , Ck, and pθ could be the
following distribution on the number N of infected people in
each clique Ci: P (N = j) = e
2j/
∑|Ci|
i=0 e
2i, j = 0, . . . , |Ci|.
Similarly, for the flu status example, we have:
• Both differential privacy and coupled worlds privacy
add noise with standard deviation ≈ 1/ to the number
of infected people. This will hide whether an Alice
participates in the data, but if flu is contagious, then
it is not enough to hide evidence of Alice’s flu status.
Note that unlike differential privacy, as the decision to
participate is made at group level, Alice has no agency
over whether she participates, and hence we cannot
argue it is enough to hide her participation.
• Group differential privacy will add noise proportional
to the size of the largest connected component; this
may result in loss of utility if this component is large,
even if the “average spread” of flu is low.
Again, we can achieve Pufferfish privacy by adding noise
proportional to the “average spread” of flu which may be
less noise than group differential privacy. For a concrete
numerical example, see Section 3.
2.3 Guarantee Against Close Adveraries
A natural question is what happens when we offer Puffer-
fish privacy with respect to a distribution class Θ, but the
adversary’s belief θ˜ does not lie in Θ. Our first result is to
show that the loss in privacy is not too large if θ˜ is close to
Θ conditioned on each secret si ∈ S, provided closeness is
quantified according to a measure called max-divergence.
Definition 2.3 (max-divergence). Let p and q be two
distributions with the same support. The max-divergence
D∞(p||q) between them is defined as:
D∞(p||q) = sup
x∈support(p)
log
p(x)
q(x)
.
For example, suppose p and q are distributions over {1, 2, 3}
such that p assigns probabilities {1/3, 1/2, 1/6} and q as-
signs probabilities {1/2, 1/4, 1/4} to 1, 2 and 3 respectively.
Then, D∞(p||q) = log 2. Max-divergence belongs to the
family of Renyi-divergences [6], which also includes the pop-
ular Kullback-Leibler divergence.
Notation. Given a belief distribution θ (which may or may
not be in the distribution class Θ), we use the notation θ|si
to denote the conditional distribution of θ given secret si.
Theorem 2.4. Let M be a mechanism that is -Pufferfish
private with respect to parameters (S,Q,Θ) and suppose that
Θ is a closed set. Suppose an adversary has beliefs repre-
sented by a distribution θ˜ /∈ Θ. Then,
e−−2∆ ≤ PM,θ(M(X) = w|si, θ)
PM,θ(M(X) = w|sj , θ) ≤ e
+2∆
where
∆ = inf
θ∈Θ
max
si∈S
max
(
D∞(θ˜|si ||θ|si), D∞(θ|si ||θ˜|si)
)
.
The conditional dependence on si cannot be removed un-
less additional conditions are met. To see this, suppose θ
places probability mass {0.9, 0.05, 0.05} and θ˜ places proba-
bility mass {0.01, 0.95, 0.04} on databases D1, D2 and D3 re-
spectively. In this case, max{D∞(θ||θ˜), D∞(θ˜‖θ)} = log 90.
Suppose now that conditioning on si tells us that the proba-
bility of occurrence of D3 is 0, but leaves the relative proba-
bilities of D1 and D2 unchanged. Then θ|si places probabil-
ity mass {0.9474, 0.0526} while θ˜|si places probability mass
{0.0104, 0.9896} on D1 and D2 respectively. In this case,
max{D∞(θ|si ||θ˜|si), D∞(θ˜|si‖θ|si)} = log 91.0962 which is
larger than max{D∞(θ||θ˜), D∞(θ˜‖θ)}.
2.4 Additional Notation
We conclude this section with some additional definitions
and notation that we will use throughout the paper.
Definition 2.5 (Lipschitz). A query F : Xn → Rk is
said to be L-Lipschitz in L1 norm if for all i and Xi, X
′
i ∈ X ,
‖F (X1, . . . , Xi, . . . , Xn)− F (X1, . . . , X ′i, . . . , Xn)‖1 ≤ L.
This means that changing one record out of n in a database
changes the L1 norm of the query output by at most L.
For example, if F (X1, . . . , Xn) is a (vector-valued) his-
togram over records X1, . . . , Xn, then F is 2-Lipschitz in
the L1 norm, as changing a single Xi can affect the count of
at most two bins.
We use the notation Lap(σ) to denote a Laplace distribu-
tion with mean 0 and scale parameter σ. Recall that this
distribution has the density function: h(x) = 1
2σ
e−|x|/σ. Ad-
ditionally, we use the notation card(S) to denote the cardi-
nality, or, the number of items in a set S.
3. A GENERAL MECHANISM
While a number of mechanisms for specific Pufferfish in-
stantiations are known [20, 18], there is no mechanism that
applies to any general Pufferfish instantiation. We next pro-
vide the first such mechanism. Given a database represented
by random variable X, a Pufferfish instantiation (S,Q,Θ),
and a query F that maps X into a scalar, we design mech-
anism M that satisfies -Pufferfish privacy in this instantia-
tion and approximates F (X).
Our proposed mechanism is inspired by the Laplace mech-
anism in differential privacy; the latter adds noise to the re-
sult of the query F proportional to the sensitivity, which is
the worst case distance between F (D) and F (D′) where D
and D′ are two databases that differ in the value of a single
individual. In Pufferfish, the quantities analogous to D and
D′ are the distributions P (F (X)|si, θ) and P (F (X)|sj , θ) for
a secret pair (si, sj), and therefore, the added noise should
be proportional to the worst case distance between these two
distributions according to some metric.
Wasserstein Distances. It turns out that the relevant
metric is the ∞-Wasserstein distance – a modification of
the Earthmover’s distance used in information retrieval and
computer vision.
Definition 3.1 (∞-Wasserstein Distance). Let µ, ν
be two probability distributions on R, and let Γ(µ, ν) be the
set of all joint distributions with marginals µ and ν. The
∞-Wasserstein distance between µ and ν is defined as:
W∞(µ, ν) = inf
γ∈Γ(µ,ν)
max
(x,y)∈support(γ)
|x− y|. (3)
Intuitively, each γ ∈ Γ(µ, ν) is a way to shift probability
mass between µ and ν; the cost of a shift γ is:
max(x,y)∈support(γ) |x− y|, and the cost of the min-cost shift
is the ∞-Wasserstein distance. It can be interpreted as the
maximum “distance” that any probability mass moves while
transforming µ to ν in the most optimal way possible. A
pictorial example is shown in Figure 1.
1/3
1/6
1/4
1/3
1/3
1/6
1/6
1/4
1/4 1/12 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6
µ:
ν:
Figure 1: An example of ∞-Wasserstein distance. The fre-
quency distributions represent two measures µ and ν, and
the arrows represent the joint distribution γ that minimizes
the right hand side of (3). Here, W∞(µ, ν) = 1.
3.1 The Wasserstein Mechanism
The main intuition behind our mechanism is based on this
interpretation. Suppose for some (si, sj) and θ, we would
like to transform P (F (X)|si, θ) to P (F (X)|sj , θ). Then, the
maximum “distance” that any probability mass moves is
Wi,j,θ = W∞ (P (F (X)|si, θ), P (F (X)|sj , θ)) ,
and adding Laplace noise with scale Wi,j,θ/ to F will guar-
antee that the likelihood ratio of the outputs under si and
sj lies in [e
−, e]. Iterating over all pairs (si, sj) ∈ Q and
all θ ∈ Θ and taking the maximum over Wi,j,θ leads to a
mechanism for the entire instantiation (S,Q,Θ).
The full mechanism is described in Algorithm 1, and its
privacy properties in Theorem 3.2. Observe that when Puffer-
fish reduces to differential privacy, then the corresponding
Wasserstein Mechanism reduces to the Laplace mechanism;
it is thus a generalization of the Laplace mechanism.
Algorithm 1 Wasserstein Mechanism (Database D, query
F , Pufferfish framework (S,Q,Θ), privacy parameter )
for all (si, sj) ∈ Q and all θ ∈ Θ such that P (si|θ) 6= 0
and P (sj |θ) 6= 0 do
Set µi,θ = P (F (X) = ·|si, θ), µj,θ = P (F (X) = ·|sj , θ).
Calculate W∞(µi,θ, µj,θ)
end for
Set W = sup(si,sj)∈Q,θ∈Θ W∞(µi,θ, µj,θ).
return F (D) + Z, where Z ∼ Lap(W

)
Example. Consider a Pufferfish instantiation of the flu
status application. Suppose that the database has size 4,
and Θ = {(Gθ, pθ)} where Gθ is a clique on 4 nodes, and pθ
is the following symmetric joint distribution on the number
N of infected individuals:
i 0 1 2 3 4
P (N = j) 0.1 0.15 0.5 0.15 0.1
From symmetry, this induces the following conditional dis-
tributions:
j 0 1 2 3 4
P (N = j|Xi = 0) 0.2 0.225 0.5 0.075 0
P (N = j|Xi = 1) 0 0.075 0.5 0.225 0.2
In this case, the parameter W in Algorithm 1 is 2, and the
Wasserstein Mechanism will add Lap(2/) noise to the num-
ber of infected individuals. As all the Xi’s are correlated,
the sensitivity mechanism with Group Differential Privacy
would add Lap(4/) noise, which gives worse utility.
3.2 Performance Guarantees
Theorem 3.2 (Wasserstein Privacy). The Wasser-
stein Mechanism provides -Pufferfish privacy in the frame-
work (S,Q,Θ).
Utility. Because of the extreme generality of the Pufferfish
framework, it is difficult to make general statements about
the utility of the Wasserstein mechanism. However, we show
that the phenomenon illustrated by the flu status example
is quite general. When X is written as X = (X1, . . . , Xn)
where Xi is the i-th individual’s private value, and the goal
is to keep each individual’s value private, the Wasserstein
Mechanism for Pufferfish never performs worse than the
Laplace mechanism for the corresponding group differential
privacy framework. The proof is in the Appendix B.1.
Theorem 3.3 (Wasserstein Utility). Let (S,Q,Θ)
be a Pufferfish framework, and let G be the corresponding
group differential privacy framework (so that G includes a
group G for each set of correlated individuals in Θ). Then,
for a L-Lipschitz query F , the parameter W in the Wasser-
stein Mechanism is less than or equal to the global sensitivity
of F in the G-group differential privacy framework.
4. A MECHANISM FOR BAYESIAN NET-
WORKS
The Wasserstein Mechanism, while general, may be com-
putationally expensive. We next consider a more restricted
setting where the database X can be written as a collec-
tion of variables X = (X1, . . . , Xn) whose dependence is
described by a Bayesian network, and the goal is to keep
the value of each Xi private. This setting is still of practical
interest, as it can be applied to physical activity monitoring
and power consumption data.
4.1 The Setting
Bayesian Networks. Bayesian networks are a class of
probabilistic models that are commonly used to model de-
pendencies among random variables or vectors, and include
popular models such as Markov Chains and trees. A Bayesian
network is described by a set of variables X = {X1, . . . , Xn}
(where each Xi is a scalar or a vector) and a directed acyclic
graph G = (X,E) whose vertices are variables in X. Since
G is directed acyclic, its edges E induce a parent-child re-
lationship parent among the nodes X. The probabilistic
dependence on X induced by the network can be written as:
P (X1, . . . , Xn) =
∏
i
P (Xi|parent(Xi)).
For example, Figure 2 shows a Bayesian Network on 4 vari-
ables, whose joint distribution is described by:
P (X1, X2, X3, X4) = P (X1)P (X2|X1)P (X3|X1)P (X4|X2, X3).
A nodeXi may have more than one parent, and as such these
networks can describe complex probabilistic dependencies.
X1
X4
X2 X3
Figure 2: A Bayesian Network on four variables.
The Framework. Specifically, we assume that the database
X can be written as X = {X1, . . . , Xn}, where each Xi lies
in a bounded domain X . Let sia denote the event that Xi
takes value a. The set of secrets is S = {sia : a ∈ X , i ∈
{1, . . . , n}}, and the set of secret pairs is Q = {(sia, sib) :
a, b ∈ X , a 6= b, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}}. We also assume that there
is an underlying known Bayesian network G = (X,E) con-
necting the variables. Each θ ∈ Θ that describes the distri-
bution of the variables is based on this Bayesian network G,
but may have different parameters.
For example, the Pufferfish instantiation in Example 1 will
fall into this framework, with n = T and G a Markov Chain
X1 → X2 → . . . XT .
Notation. We use X with a lowercase subscript, for ex-
ample, Xi, to denote a single node in G, and X with an
uppercase subscript, for example, XA, to denote a set of
nodes in G. For a set of nodes XA we use the notation
card(XA) to denote the number of nodes in XA.
4.2 The Markov Quilt Mechanism
The main insight behind our mechanism is that if nodesXi
and Xj are “far apart” in G, then, Xj is largely independent
of Xi. Thus, to obscure the effect of Xi on the result of a
query, it is sufficient to add noise proportional to the number
of nodes that are “local” to Xi plus a correction term to
account for the effect of the distant nodes. The rest of the
section will explain how to calculate this correction term,
and how to determine how many nodes are local.
First, we quantify how much changing the value of a vari-
able Xi ∈ X can affect a set of variables XA ⊂ X, where
Xi /∈ XA and the dependence is described by a distribution
θ in a class Θ. To this end, we define the max-influence of
a variable Xi on a set of variables XA under a distribution
class Θ as follows.
Definition 4.1 (max-influence). We define the max-
influence of a variable Xi on a set of variables XA under Θ
as:
eΘ(XA|Xi) =
sup
θ∈Θ
max
a,b∈X
max
xA∈X card(XA)
log
P (XA = xA|Xi = a, θ)
P (XA = xA|Xi = b, θ) .
Here X is the range of any Xj . The max-influence is
thus the maximum max-divergence between the distribu-
tions XA|Xi = a, θ and XA|Xi = b, θ where the maximum
is taken over any pair (a, b) ∈ X × X and any θ ∈ Θ. If
XA and Xi are independent, then the max-influence of Xi
on XA is 0, and a large max-influence means that changing
Xi can have a large impact on the distribution of XA. In a
Bayesian network, the max-influence of any Xi and XA can
be calculated given the probabilistic dependence.
Our mechanism will attempt to find large sets XA such
that Xi has low max-influence on XA under Θ. The naive
way to do so is through brute force search, which takes time
exponential in the size of G. We next show how structural
properties of the Bayesian network G can be exploited to
perform this search more efficiently.
Markov Blankets and Quilts. For this purpose, we pro-
vide a second definition that generalizes the Markov Blan-
ket, a standard notion in probabilistic graphical models [21].
The Markov Blanket of a node Xu in a Bayesian network
consists of its parents, its children and the other parents of
its children, and the rest of the nodes in the network are
independent of Xu conditioned on its Markov Blanket. We
define its generalization, the Markov Quilt, as follows.
Definition 4.2 (Markov Quilt). A set of nodes XQ,
Q ⊂ {1, . . . , n} in a Bayesian network G = (X,E) is a
Markov Quilt for a node Xi if the following conditions hold:
1. Deleting XQ partitions G into parts XN and XR such
that X = XN ∪XQ ∪XR and Xi ∈ XN .
2. For all xR ∈ X card(XR), all xQ ∈ X card(XQ) and for
all a ∈ X , P (XR = xR|XQ = xQ, Xi = a) = P (XR =
xR|XQ = xQ).
Thus, XR is independent of Xi conditioned on XQ.
Intuitively, XR is a set of “remote” nodes that are far from
Xi, and XN is the set of “nearby” nodes; XN and XR are
separated by the Markov Quilt XQ. Observe that unlike
Markov Blankets, a node can have many Markov Quilts.
Figure 3 shows an example. We also allow the“trivial Markov
Quilt” with XQ = ∅, XN = X and XR = ∅.
Suppose we would like to release the result of a L-Lipschitz
scalar query F while protecting a node Xi. If we can find a
Markov Quilt (XN , XQ, XR) such that the max-influence of
Xi on XQ under Θ is at most δ, then, it is sufficient to add
Laplace noise to F with scale parameter L·card(XN )/(−δ).
This motivates the following mechanism, which we call the
Markov Quilt Mechanism. To protect Xi, we search over a
set SQ,i of Markov Quilts for Xi and pick the one which re-
quires adding the least amount of noise. We then iterate over
all Xi and add to F the maximum amount of noise needed
to protect any Xi; this ensures that the private values of all
nodes are protected. Details are presented in Algorithm 2,
and Theorem 4.3 establishes its privacy properties.
Vector-Valued Functions. The mechanism can be easily
generalized to vector-valued functions. If F is L-Lipschitz
with respect to L1 norm, then from Proposition 1 of [8],
adding noise drawn from L ·σmax ·Lap(1) to each coordinate
of F guarantees -Pufferfish privacy.
Theorem 4.3 (Markov Quilt Mechanism Privacy).
If F is L-Lipschitz, and if each SQ,i contains the trivial quilt
XQ = ∅ (with XN = X, XR = ∅) , then the Markov Quilt
Mechanism preserves -Pufferfish privacy in the instantia-
tion (S,Q,Θ) described in Section 4.1.
4.3 Composition
Unlike differential privacy, Pufferfish privacy does not al-
ways compose [20], in the sense that the privacy parame-
ter may not decay gracefully as the same data (or related
XN
Xi+1 Xi+2XiXi−2
XBXB
Xi−1
(a) The Markov Blanket of Xi is XB =
{Xi−1, Xi+1}
Xi+1 Xi+2 Xi+3 Xi+4XiXi−1Xi−2Xi−3
XR XR
XQXQ XN
(b) One Markov Quilt of Xi is XQ = {Xi−2, Xi+2} with corresponding
XN = {Xi−1, Xi, Xi+1}, XR = {. . . , Xi−3, Xi+3, . . . }
Figure 3: Illustration of Markov Blanket and Markov Quilt
Algorithm 2 Markov Quilt Mechanism (Database D, L-
Lipschitz query F , Pufferfish instantiation (S,Q,Θ), privacy
parameter , Markov Quilts set SQ,i for each Xi)
for all Xi do
for all Markov Quilts XQ (with XN , XR) in SQ,i do
if max-influence eΘ(XQ|Xi) <  then
σ(XQ) =
card(XN )
−eΘ(XQ|Xi) /*score of XQ*/
else
σ(XQ) =∞
end if
end for
σi = minXQ∈SQ,i σ(XQ)
end for
σmax = maxi σi
return F (D) + (L · σmax) · Z, where Z ∼ Lap(1)
data) is used in multiple privacy-preserving computations.
We show below that the Markov Quilt Mechanism does com-
pose under certain conditions. We believe that this property
makes the mechanism highly attractive.
Theorem 4.4 (Sequential Composition). Let {Fk}Kk=1
be a set of Lipschitz queries, (S,Q,Θ) be a Pufferfish instan-
tiation as defined in Section 4.1, and D be a database. Given
fixed Markov Quilt sets {SQ,i}ni=1 for all Xi, let Mk(D) de-
note the Markov Quilt Mechanism that publishes Fk(D) with
-Pufferfish privacy under (S,Q,Θ) using Markov Quilt sets
{SQ,i}ni=1. Then publishing (M1(D), . . . ,MK(D)) guaran-
tees K-Pufferfish privacy under (S,Q,Θ).
To prove the theorem, we define active Markov Quilt X∗Q,i
for a node Xi.
Definition 4.5. (Active Markov Quilt) In an instance of
the Markov Quilt Mechanism M , we say that a Markov Quilt
XQ (with corresponding XN , XR) for a node Xi is active if
XQ = arg minXQ∈SQ,i σ(XQ), and thus σ(XQ) = σi. We
denote this Markov Quilt as X∗Q,i.
For example, consider a Markov Chain of length T = 3
with the following initial distribution and transition matrix([
0.8
0.2
]
,
[
0.9 0.1
0.4 0.6
])
.
Suppose we want to guarantee Pufferfish privacy with  =
10. Consider the middle node X2. The possible Markov
Quilts for X2 are SQ,2 = {∅, {X1}, {X3}, {X1, X3}}, which
have max-influence 0, log 6, log 6, log 36 and quilt sizes 3, 2, 2, 1
respectively. The scores therefore are 0.3, 0.2437, 0.2437
and 0.1558, and the active Markov Quilt for X2 is X
∗
Q,2 =
{X1, X3} since it has the lowest score.
The proof to Theorem 4.4 is in Appendix C.1. We note
that the condition for the Markov Quilt Mechanism to com-
pose linearly is that all Mk’s use the same active Markov
Quilt. This holds automatically if the privacy parameter 
and Markov Quilt set SQ,i are the same for all Mk. If differ-
ent levels of privacy {k}Kk=1 are required, we can guarantee
K maxk∈{1,...,K} k-Pufferfish privacy as long as the same
SQ,i is used across Mk.
4.4 Case Study: Markov Chains
Algorithm 2 can still be computationally expensive, es-
pecially if the underlying Bayesian network is complex and
the set Θ is large and unstructured. In this section, we
show that when the underlying graph is a Markov Chain,
the mechanism can be made more efficient.
The Setting. We use the same setting as Example 1 that
was described in detail in Section 2.2. We assume that there
are k activities so that the state space X = {1, . . . , k}. Thus
each θ ∈ Θ corresponds to a tuple (qθ, Pθ) where qθ is a k×1
vector that describes the distribution of the first state and
Pθ is a k × k transition matrix.
A Running Example. As a concrete running example in
this section, consider a database of T = 100 records repre-
sented by a Markov Chain X1 → . . . → X100 where each
state Xi can take k = 2 values, 0 and 1. Also let:
Θ =
{
θ1 =
([
1
0
]
,
[
0.9 0.1
0.4 0.6
])
, θ2 =
([
0.9
0.1
]
,
[
0.8 0.2
0.3 0.7
])}
be the set of distributions. Suppose we set  = 1.
Sources of Inefficiency. There are three potential sources
of computational inefficiency in the Markov Quilt Mecha-
nism. First, searching over all Markov Quilts in a set is
inefficient if there are a large number of quilts. Second, cal-
culating the max-influence of a fixed quilt is expensive if the
probabilistic dependence between the variables is complex,
and finally, searching over all θ ∈ Θ is inefficient if Θ is large
and unstructured.
We show below how to mitigate the computational com-
plexity of all three sources for Markov Chains. First we
show how to exploit structural information to improve the
computational efficiency of the first two. Next we propose
an approximation using tools from Markov Chain theory
that will considerably improve the computational efficiency
of searching over all θ ∈ Θ. The improvement preserves -
Pufferfish privacy, but might come at the expense of some
additional loss in accuracy.
4.4.1 Exploiting Structural Information
First, we show how to exploit structural information to
improve the running time.
Bounding the Number of Markov Quilts. Technically,
the number of Markov Quilts for a node Xi in a Markov
Chain of length T is exponential in T . Fortunately however,
Lemma 4.6 shows that for the purpose of finding the quilt
with the lowest score for any Xi, it is sufficient to search
over only O(T 2) quilts. The proof is in the Appendix.
Lemma 4.6. In the setting of Section 4.4, let the set of
Markov Quilts SQ,i be as follows:
SQ,i = {{Xi−a, Xi+b}, {Xi−a}, {Xi+b}, ∅
|1 ≤ a ≤ i− 1, 1 ≤ b ≤ T − i} (4)
Consider any Markov Quilt (XN , XQ, XR) for Xi that may
or may not lie in SQi . Then, the score of this quilt is greater
than or equal to the score of some (XN′ , XQ′ , XR′) in SQ,i.
Calculating the max-influence. Consider the max-influence
of a set of variables XQ on a variable Xi under a fixed θ ∈ Θ.
Calculating it may be expensive if the probabilistic depen-
dency among the variables in XQ and Xi is complex under θ.
We show below that for Markov Chains, this max-influence
may be computed relatively efficiently.
Suppose XQ = {Xi−a, Xi+b}, and recall that a state can
take values in X = {1, . . . , k}. Then, we can write:
e{θ}(XQ|Xi)
= max
x,x′,xi−a,xi+b∈X
log
P (Xi−a = xi−a, Xi+b = xi+b|Xi = x, θ)
P (Xi−a = xi−a, Xi+b = xi+b|Xi = x′, θ)
= max
x,x′∈X
(
log
P (Xi = x
′, θ)
P (Xi = x, θ)
+ max
xi+b∈X
log
P (Xi+b = xi+b|Xi = x, θ)
P (Xi+b = xi+b|Xi = x′, θ)
+ max
xi−a∈X
log
P (Xi = x|Xi−a = xi−a, θ)
P (Xi = x′|Xi−a = xi−a, θ)
)
. (5)
(5) allows for efficient computation of the max-influence.
Given an initial distribution and a transition matrix, for
each x and x′ pair, the first term in (5) can be calculated
in O(ik2) time, and the second and third in O((a + b)k3)
time each. Taking the maximum over all x and x′ involves
another O(k2) operations, leading to a total running time
of O(ik2 + (a+ b)k3). Similar formulas can be obtained for
quilts of the form XQ = {Xi−a} and XQ = {Xi+b}. Note
for the special case of the trivial Markov Quilt, the max-
influence is 0, which takes O(1) time to compute.
Algorithm MQMExact. Thus, using structural proper-
ties of Markov Chains gives a more efficient instantiation
of the Markov Quilt Mechanism that we describe in Algo-
rithm 3.
We remark that to improve efficiency, instead of searching
over all O(T 2) Markov Quilts for a node Xi, we search only
over Markov Quilts whose endpoints lie at a distance ≤ `
from Xi. Since there are O(`
2) such Markov Quilts, this
reduces the running time if ` T .
Concretely, consider using Algorithm MQMExact on our
running example with ` = T . For θ1, a search over each
Xi gives that X8 has the highest score, which is 13.0219,
achieved by Markov Quilt {X3, X13}. For θ2, X6 has the
highest score, 10.6402, achieved by the Markov Quilt {X10}.
Thus, the algorithm adds noise Z ∼ Lap(13.0219×L) to the
exact query value.
Running Time Analysis. A naive implementation of Al-
gorithm 3 would run in time O(T`2|Θ|(`k3 + Tk2)). How-
ever, we can use the following observations to speed up the
algorithm considerably.
Algorithm 3 MQMExact(Database D, L-Lipschitz query
F , Θ, privacy parameter , maximum Markov Quilt size
parameter `)
for all θ ∈ Θ do
for all Xi do
SQ,i = {{Xi−a, Xi+b} : i−a > 0, i+b ≤ T, a+b < `}
∪ {{Xi−a} : i− a ≥ T − `} ∪ {{Xi+b} : i+ b < `} ∪
{∅} /*all quilts with end-points at distance
≤ ` plus the trivial quilt */
for all Markov Quilts XQ ∈ SQ,i do
Calculate e{θ}(XQ|Xi) from (5)
if e{θ}(XQ|Xi) <  then
σ(XQ) =
card(XN )
−e{θ}(XQ|Xi) /*score of XQ*/
else
σ(XQ) =∞
end if
end for
σi = minXQ∈SQ,i σ(XQ)
end for
σθmax = maxi σi
end for
σmax = maxθ∈Θ σθmax
return F (D) + (L · σmax) · Z, where Z ∼ Lap(1)
First, observe that for a fixed θ, we can use dynamic pro-
gramming to compute and store all the probabilities P (Xi|θ),
P (Xi|Xi−a) and P (Xi+b|Xi) together in time O(Tk3). Sec-
ond, note that once these probabilities are stored, the rest
is a matter of maximization; for fixed Xi, Markov Quilt
XQ and θ, we can calculate e{θ}(XQ|Xi) from (5) in time
O(k3); iterating over all Xi, and all O(`
2) Markov Quilts for
Xi gives a running time of O(Tk
3 + T`2k3). Finally, iterat-
ing over all θ ∈ Θ gives a final running time of O(T`2k3|Θ|)
which much improves the naive implementation.
Additional optimizations may be used to improve the effi-
ciency even further. In Appendix C.4, we show that if Θ in-
cludes all possible initial distributions for a set of transition
matrices, then we can avoid iterating over all initial distri-
butions by a direct optimization procedure. Finally, another
important observation is that when the initial distribution
under θ is the stationery distribution of the Markov Chain –
as can happen when data consists of samples drawn from a
Markov process in a stable state, such as, household electric-
ity consumption in a steady state – then for any i ∈ [a, T−b],
the max-influence e{θ}({Xi−a, Xi+b}|Xi) depends only on a
and b and is independent of i. This eliminates the need to
conduct a separate search for each i, and further improves
efficiency by a factor of T .
4.4.2 Approximating the max-influence
Unfortunately, Algorithm 3 may still be computationally
inefficient when Θ is large. In this section, we show how
to mitigate this effect by computing an upper bound on the
max-influence under a set of distributions Θ in closed form
using tools from Markov Chain theory. Note that now we
can no longer compute an exact score; however, since we
use an upper bound on the score, the resulting mechanism
remains -Pufferfish private.
Definitions from Markov Chain Theory. We begin
with reviewing some definitions and notation from Markov
Chain theory that we will need. For a Markov Chain with
transition matrix Pθ, we use piθ to denote its stationary dis-
tribution [1]. We define the time reversal Markov Chain
corresponding to Pθ as follows.
Definition 4.7 (time-reversal). Let Pθ be the tran-
sition matrix of a Markov Chain θ. If piθ is the stationery
distribution of θ, then, the corresponding time-reversal Markov
Chain is defined as the chain with transition matrix P ∗θ where:
P ∗θ (x, y)piθ(x) = Pθ(y, x)piθ(y).
Intuitively, P ∗θ is the transition matrix when we run the
Markov process described by Pθ backwards from XT to X1.
In our running example, for both θ1 and θ2, the time-
reversal chain has the same transition matrix as the original
chain, i.e., P ∗θ1 = Pθ1 , P
∗
θ2
= Pθ2 .
We next define two more parameters of a set Θ of Markov
Chains and show that an upper bound to the max-influence
under Θ can be written as a function of these two param-
eters. First, we define piminΘ as the minimum probability of
any state under the stationary distribution piθ of any Markov
Chain θ ∈ Θ. Specifically,
piminΘ = min
x∈X ,θ∈Θ
piθ(x). (6)
In our running example, the stationary distribution of the
transition matrix for θ1 is [0.8, 0.2] and thus pi
min
{θ1} = 0.2;
similarly, θ2 has stationary distribution [0.6, 0.4] and thus
pimin{θ2} = 0.4. We have pi
min
Θ = 0.2.
Additionally, we define gΘ as the minimum eigengap of
PθP
∗
θ for any θ ∈ Θ. Formally,
gΘ = min
θ∈Θ
min{1− |λ| : PθP ∗θ x = λx, |λ| < 1}. (7)
In our running example, the eigengap for both Pθ1P
∗
θ1
and
Pθ2P
∗
θ2
is 0.75, and thus we have gΘ = 0.75.
Algorithm MQMApprox. The following Lemma charac-
terizes an upper bound of the max-influence of a variable Xi
on a XQ under a set Θ of Markov Chains as a function of
piminΘ and gΘ.
Lemma 4.8. Suppose the Markov Chains induced by each
Pθ ∈ Θ are irreducible and aperiodic with piΘ > 0 and gΘ >
0. If a, b ≥ 2 log(1/piminΘ )
gΘ
, then the max-influence eΘ(XQ|Xi)
of a Markov Quilt XQ = {Xi−a, Xi+b} on a node Xi under
Θ is at most:
log
(
piminΘ + exp(−gΘb/2)
piminΘ − exp(−gΘb/2)
)
+ 2 log
(
piminΘ + exp(−gΘa/2)
piminΘ − exp(−gΘa/2)
)
.
The proof is in the Appendix. Observe that the irre-
ducibility and aperiodicity conditions may be necessary –
without these conditions, the Markov Chain may not mix,
and hence we may not be able to offer privacy.
Results similar to Lemma 4.8 can be obtained for Markov
Quilts of the form XQ = {Xi−a} or {Xi+b} as well. Fi-
nally, in the special case that the chains are reversible, a
tighter upper bound may be obtained; these are stated in
Lemma C.1 in the Appendix.
Lemma 4.8 indicates that when Θ is parametrized by gΘ
and piminΘ , (an upper bound on) the score of each XQ may
thus be calculated in O(1) time based on Lemma 4.8. This
gives rise to Algorithm 4. Like Algorithm 3, we can again
improve efficiency by confining our search to Markov Quilts
where the local set XN has size at most `.
Running Time Analysis. A naive analysis shows that
Algorithm 4 has a worst case running time of O(T`2) – T
iterations to go over all Xi, O(`
2) Markov Quilts per Xi,
and O(1) time to calculate an upper bound on the score of
each quilt. However, the following Lemma shows that this
running time can be improved significantly when Θ has some
nice properties.
Lemma 4.9. Suppose the Markov Chains induced by Θ
are aperiodic and irreducible with gΘ, pi
min
Θ > 0. Let a
∗ =
2dlog
(
exp(/6)+1
exp(/6)−1
1
piminΘ
)
/gΘe. If the length of the chain T is
≥ 8a∗, then, the optimal Markov Quilt for the middle node
XdT/2e of the chain is of the form XQ = {XdT/2e−a, XdT/2e+b}
where a+b ≤ 4a∗. Additionally, the maximum score σmax =
σdT/2e.
Lemma 4.9 implies that for long enough chains, it is suf-
ficient to search over Markov Quilts of length ` = 4a∗, and
only over Xi = XdT/2e; this leads to a running time of
O((a∗)2), which is considerably better and independent of
the length of the chain.
Algorithm 4 MQMApprox(Database D, L-Lipschitz query
F , Θ containing Markov chains of length T , privacy param-
eter , maximum Markov Quilts length `
for all Xi do
SQ,i = {{Xi−a, Xi+b} : i−a > 0, i+ b ≤ T, a+ b < `} ∪
{{Xi−a} : i− a ≥ T − `} ∪ {{Xi+b} : i+ b < `} ∪ {∅}
/*all quilts with end-points at distance ≤ ` plus
the trivial quilt */
for all Markov Quilts XQ in SQ,i do
Calculate eΘ(XQ|Xi) from Lemma 4.8
if max-influence eΘ(XQ|Xi) <  then
σ(XQ) =
card(XN )
−eΘ(XQ|Xi) /*score of XQ*/
else
σ(XQ) =∞
end if
end for
σi = minXQ∈SQ,i σ(XQ)
end for
σmax = maxi σi
return F (D) + (L · σmax) · Z, where Z ∼ Lap(1)
Utility. We conclude with an utility analysis of Algorithm 4.
Theorem 4.10 (Utility Guarantees). Suppose we ap-
ply Algorithm 4 to release an approximation to a 1-Lipschitz
query F of the states in the Pufferfish instantiation in Ex-
ample 1. If the length T of the chain satisfies:
T ≥ 8dlog
(
exp(/6)+1
exp(/6)−1
1
piΘ
)
/gΘe + 3, then the Laplace noise
added by the Markov Quilt Mechanism has scale parameter
≤ C/ for some positive constant C that depends only on Θ.
The proof is in the Appendix. Theorem 4.10 implies that
the noise added does not grow with T and the relative accu-
racy improves with more and more observations. A careful
examination of the proof also shows that the amount of noise
added is an upper bound on the mixing time of the chain.
Thus if Θ consists of rapidly mixing chains, then Algorithm 4
provides both privacy and utility.
5. EXPERIMENTS
We next demonstrate the practical applicability of the
Markov Quilt Mechanism when the underlying Bayesian net-
work is a discrete time homogeneous Markov chain and the
goal is to hide the private value of a single time entry – in
short, the setting of Section 4.4. Our goal in this section is
to address the following questions:
1. What is the privacy-utility tradeoff offered by the Markov
Quilt Mechanism as a function of the privacy parame-
ter  and the distribution class Θ?
2. How does this tradeoff compare against existing base-
lines, such as [14] and Group-differential privacy?
3. What is the accuracy-run time tradeoff offered by the
MQMApprox algorithm as compared with MQMExact?
These questions are considered in three different contexts
– (a) a small problem involving a synthetic dataset gener-
ated by a two-state Markov Chain, (b) a medium-sized prob-
lem involving real physical activity measurement data and a
four-state Markov Chain, and (c) a large problem involving
real data on power consumption in a single household over
time and a fifty-one state Markov Chain.
5.1 Methodology
Experimental Setup. Our experiments involve the Puffer-
fish instantiation of Example 1 described in Section 2.2. To
ensure that results across different chain lengths are compa-
rable, we release a private relative frequency histogram over
states of the chain which represents the (approximate) frac-
tion of time spent in each state. This is a vector valued
query, and is 2
T
-Lipschitz in its L1-norm.
For our experiments, we consider three values of the pri-
vacy parameter  that are representative of three different
privacy regimes – 0.2 (high privacy), 1 (moderate privacy),
5 (low privacy). All run-times are reported for a desktop
with a 3.00 GHz Intel Core i5-3330 CPU and 8GB memory.
Algorithms. Our experiments involve four mechanisms
that guarantee -Pufferfish privacy – GroupDP, GK16,
MQMApprox and MQMExact.
GroupDP is a simple baseline that assumes that all en-
tries in a connected chain are completely correlated, and
therefore adds Lap(1/) noise to each bin. GK16 is the algo-
rithm proposed by [14], which defines and computes an “in-
fluence matrix” for each θ ∈ Θ. The algorithm applies only
when the spectral norm of this matrix is less than 1, and the
standard deviation of noise added increases as the spectral
norm approaches 1. We also use two variants of the Markov
Quilt Mechanism – MQMExact and MQMApprox.
5.2 Simulations
We first consider synthetic data generated by a binary
Markov Chain of length T = 100 with states {0, 1}; the
setup is chosen so that all algorithms are computationally
tractable when run on reasonable classes Θ. The transition
matrix of such a chain is completely determined by two pa-
rameters – p0 = P (Xi+1 = 0|Xi = 0) and p1 = P (Xi+1 =
1|Xi = 1), and its initial distribution by a single parameter
q0 = P (X1 = 0). Thus a distribution θ ∈ Θ is represented by
a tuple (q0, p0, p1), and a distribution class Θ by a set of such
tuples. To allow for effective visualization, we represent the
distribution class Θ by an interval [α, β] which means that
Θ includes all transition matrices for which p0, p1 ∈ [α, β]
and all initial distribution q in the 2-dimensional probabil-
ity simplex. When 0 < p0, p1 < 1, the chain is guaranteed
to be aperiodic, irreducible and reversible, and we can use
the approximation from Lemma C.1 for MQMApprox. We
use the optimization procedure described in Appendix C.4
to improve the efficiency of MQMExact. Finally, since the
histogram has only two bins, it is sufficient to look at the
query F (X) = 1
T
∑T
i=1 Xi which is
1
T
-Lipschitz.
To generate synthetic data from a family Θ = [α, β], we
pick p0 and p1 uniformly from [α, β], and an initial state dis-
tribution uniformly from the probability simplex. We then
generate a state sequence X1, . . . , XT of length T from the
corresponding distribution. For ease of presentation, we re-
strict Θ to be intervals where β = 1−α, and vary α from in
0.1 to 0.4. We vary  in {0.2, 1, 5}, repeat each experiment
500 times, and report the average error between the actual
F (X) and its reported value. For the run-time experiments,
we report the average running time of the procedure that
computes the scale parameter for the Laplace noise in each
algorithm; the average is taken over all θ = (p0, p1) in a grid
where p0, p1 vary in {0.1, 0.11, . . . , 0.9}.
Figure 4 (upper row) shows the accuracy results, and Ta-
ble 2 (Column 2) the run-time results for  = 1. The val-
ues for GroupDP have high variance and are not plotted in
the figure; these values are around 5, 1, 0.2 respectively. As
expected, for a given , the errors of GK16, MQMApprox
and MQMExact decrease as α increases, i.e, the distribu-
tion class Θ becomes narrower. When α is to the left of
the black dashed line in the figure, GK16 does not apply as
the spectral norm of the influence matrix becomes > 1; the
position of this line does not change as a function of . In
contrast, MQMApprox and MQMExact still provide privacy
and reasonable utility. As expected, MQMExact is more ac-
curate than MQMApprox, but requires higher running time.
Thus, the Markov Quilt Mechanism applies to a wider range
of distribution families than GK16; in the region where all
mechanisms work, MQMApprox and MQMExact perform
significantly better than GK16 for a range of parameter val-
ues, and somewhat worse for the remaining range.
5.3 Real Data
We next apply our algorithm to two real datasets on phys-
ical activity measurement and power consumption. Since
these are relatively large problems with large state-spaces,
it is extremely difficult to search over all Markov Chains in
a class Θ, and both GK16 as well as MQMExact become
highly computation intensive. To ensure a fair comparison,
we pick Θ to be a singleton set {θ}, where θ = (qθ, Pθ);
here Pθ is the transition matrix obtained from the data, and
qθ is its stationary distribution. For MQMApprox, we use
` from Lemma 4.9, while for MQMExact we use as ` the
length of the optimal Markov Quilt that was returned by
MQMApprox.
5.3.1 Physical Activity Measurement
We use an activity dataset provided by [11, 12, 10], which
includes monitoring data from a study of daily habits of
40 cyclists, 16 older women, and 36 overweight women. The
dataset includes four activities – active, standing still, stand-
ing moving and sedentary – for all three groups of partic-
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Figure 4: Upper row: L1 error of frequency of state 1 vs. α for  = 0.2, 1, 5 for synthetic data. Recall that Θ = [α, 1−α], so
Θ shrinks as we go right. GK16 does not apply left of the black dashed vertical line. GroupDP has error around 5, 1, 0.2 for
 = 0.5, 1, 5 respectively. Reported values are averaged over 500 random trials. Lower row: Exact and private aggregated
physical activity relative frequency histograms for three groups of participants. Reported values are for 20 random trials and
 = 1. Recall GK16 does not apply for this problem.
Algorithm
cyclist older woman overweight woman
Agg Indi Agg Indi Agg Indi
DP 0.2918 N/A 0.8746 N/A 0.4763 N/A
GroupDP 0.0834 2.3157 0.1138 1.7860 0.0458 1.1492
GK16 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
MQMApprox 0.0107 0.6319 0.0156 0.2790 0.0048 0.1967
MQMExact 0.0074 0.4077 0.0098 0.1742 0.0033 0.1316
Table 1: L1 error of the relative frequency histograms for individual and aggregate tasks for physical activity of three
participant groups.  = 1. Reported values are averaged over 20 random trials.
Algorithm Synthetic cyclist older woman overweight woman electricity power
GK16 6.3589× 10−4 N/A N/A N/A N/A
MQMApprox 1.8458× 10−4 0.0064 0.0060 0.0028 0.0567
MQMExact 7.6794× 10−4 1.5186 1.2786 0.6299 282.2273
Table 2: Running time (in seconds) of an optimized algorithm that calculates the scale parameter of the Laplace noise
(averaged over 5 runs).  = 1.
ipants,1 and thus the underlying θ is a four-state Markov
Chain. Activities are recorded about every 12 seconds for 7
days when the participants are awake, which gives us more
than 9, 000 observations per person on an average in each
group. To address missing values, we treat gaps of more
than 10 minutes as the starting point of a new independent
Markov Chain. Observe that this improves the performance
of GroupDP, since the noise added is Lap(M/T), where M
is the length of the longest chain. For each group of partic-
ipants, we calculate a single empirical transition matrix Pθ
based on the entire group; this Pθ is used in the experiments.
1For cyclists, data also includes cycling, which we merge
with active for ease of analysis and presentation.
For this application, we consider two tasks – aggregate and
individual. In the aggregate task, the goal is to publish a
private aggregated relative frequency histogram2 over par-
ticipants in each group in order to analyze their comparative
activity patterns. While in theory this task can be achieved
with differential privacy, this gives poor utility as the group
sizes are small. In the individual task, we publish the rela-
tive frequency histogram for each individual and report the
average error across individuals in each group.
2Recall that in a relative frequency histogram, we report
the number of observations in each bin divided by the total
number of observations.
Table 1 summarizes the L1 errors for the three groups and
both tasks for  = 1. For the aggregate task, we also report
the error of a differentially private release (denoted as DP).
Note that the error of the individual task is the average
L1 error of each individual in the group. Figure 4 (lower
row) presents the exact and private aggregated relative fre-
quency histograms for the three groups. Table 2 (Columns
2-4) presents the time taken to calculate the scale parame-
ter of the Laplce noise for each group of participants; as this
running time depends on both the size of the group as well
as the activity patterns, larger groups do not always have
higher running times.
The results in Table 1 show that the utilities of both
MQMApprox and MQMExact are significantly better than
that of GroupDPfor all datasets and tasks, and are signif-
icantly better than DP for the aggregated task. As ex-
pected, MQMExact is better than MQMApprox, but has
a higher running time. We also find that GK16 cannot be
applied to any of the tasks, since the spectral norm of the
influence matrix is > 1; this holds for all  as the spectral
norm condition does not depend on the value of . Fig-
ure 4 (lower row) shows the activity patterns of the different
groups: the active time spent by the cyclist group is signifi-
cantly longer than the other two groups, and the sedentary
time spent by overweight women group is the longest. These
patterns are visible from the private histograms published
by MQMApprox and MQMExact, but not necessarily from
those published by GroupDP.
5.3.2 Electricity Consumption
Algorithm  = 0.2  = 1  = 5
GroupDP 516.1555 102.8868 19.8712
GK16 N/A N/A N/A
MQMApprox 0.3369 0.0614 0.0113
MQMExact 0.1298 0.0188 0.0022
Table 3: L1 error of relative frequency histogram for elec-
tricity consumption data. Reported values are averaged over
20 random trials.
We use data on electricity consumption of a single house-
hold in the greater Vancouver area provided by [26]. Power
consumption (in Watt) is recorded every 1 minute for about
two years. Missing values in the original recording have
been filled in before the dataset is published. We discretize
the power values into 51 intervals, each of length 200(W),
resulting in a Markov chain with 51 states of length T ≈
1, 000, 000. Our goal again is to publish a private approxi-
mation to the relative frequency histogram of power levels.
Table 3 reports the L1 errors of the four algorithms on
electricity power dataset for different  values, and Table 2
the times required to calculate the scale parameter. We
again find that GK16 does not apply as the spectral norm
condition is not satisfied. The error of GroupDP is very
large, because the data forms a single Markov chain, and
the number of states is relatively large. We find that in spite
of the large number of bins, MQMApprox and MQMExact
have high utility; for example, even for  = 0.2, the per bin
error of MQMExact is about 0.25 percent, and for  = 1,
the per bin error is 0.04 percent. Finally, while the running
time of MQMExact is an order of magnitude higher than
MQMApprox, it is still manageable (< 5 minutes) for this
problem.
5.4 Discussion
We now reconsider our initial questions. First, as ex-
pected, the experiments show that the utility of GK16 and
both versions of Markov Quilt Mechanism decreases with
decreasing  and increasing size of Θ. The utility of GroupDP
does not change with Θ and is not very high; again this
is to be expected as GroupDP depends only on the worst-
case correlation. Overall the utility of both versions of the
Markov Quilt Mechanism improve for longer chains.
Comparing with GK16, we find that for synthetic data,
the Markov Quilt Mechanism applies to a much wider range
of distribution families; in the region where all mechanisms
work, MQMApprox and MQMExact perform significantly
better than GK16 for a range of parameter values, and
somewhat worse for the remaining range. For the two real
datasets we consider, GK16 does not apply. We suspect this
is because the influence matrix in [14] is calculated based on
local transitions between successive time intervals (for ex-
ample, Xt as a function of Xt−1); instead, the Markov Quilt
Mechanism implicitly takes into account transitions across
periods (for example, how Xt+k as a function of Xt). Our
experiments imply that this spectral norm condition may be
quite restrictive in practical applications.
Finally, our experiments show that there is indeed a gap
between the performance of MQMExact and MQMApprox,
as well as their running times, although the running time
of MQMExact still remains manageable for relatively large
problems. Based on these results, we recommend using
MQMExact for medium-sized problems where the state space
is smaller (and thus computing the max-influence is easier)
but less data is available, and MQMApprox for larger prob-
lems where the state space is larger but there is a lot of data
to mitigate the effect of the approximation.
6. CONCLUSION
We present a detailed study of how Pufferfish may be ap-
plied to achieve privacy in correlated data problems. We
establish robustness properties of Pufferfish against adver-
sarial beliefs, and we provide the first mechanism that ap-
plies to any Pufferfish instantiation. We provide a more
computationally efficient mechanism for Bayesian networks,
and establish its composition properties. We derive a ver-
sion of our mechanism for Markov Chains, and evaluate it
experimentally on a small, medium and a large problem on
time series data. Our results demonstrate that Pufferfish
offers a good solution for privacy in these problems.
We believe that our work is a first step towards a compre-
hensive study of privacy in correlated data. There are many
interesting privacy problems – such as privacy of users con-
nected into social networks and privacy of spatio-temporal
information gathered from sensors. With the proliferation of
sensors and “internet-of-things” devices, these privacy prob-
lems will become increasingly pressing. We believe that an
important line of future work is to model these problems in
rigorous privacy frameworks such as Pufferfish and design
novel mechanisms for these models.
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APPENDIX
A. PUFFERFISH PRIVACY DETAILS
Proof. (of Theorem 2.4) Since Θ is a closed set, for finite
D, there must exist some distribution in Θ that achieves ∆.
Call this θ. The ratio P (M(X=w)|si,θ˜)
P (M(X)=w|sj ,θ˜)
is equal to:
P (M(X) = w|si, θ˜)
P (M(X) = w|si, θ)
P (M(X) = w|sj , θ)
P (M(X) = w|sj , θ˜)
P (M(X) = w|si, θ)
P (M(X) = w|sj , θ) .
(8)
Bu Pufferfish, the last ratio in (8) ∈ [e−, e]. Since the
outcome of M given X is independent of the generation
process for X, we have
P (M(X) = w|si, θ˜)
P (M(X) = w|si, θ) =
∫
D
P (M(D) = w)P (X = D|si, θ˜)dD∫
D
P (M(D) = w)P (X = D|si, θ)dD
≤max
D
P (X = D|si, θ˜)
P (X = D|si, θ) ≤ e
D∞(X|θ˜,si‖X|θ,si) ≤ e∆.
Similarly, we can show that this ratio is also ≥ e−∆. Apply-
ing the same argument to the second ratio in (8) along with
simple algebra concludes the proof.
B. WASSERSTEIN MECHANISM PROOFS
Proof. (Of Theorem 3.2) Let (si, sj) be secret pair in Q
such that that P (si|θ), P (sj |θ) > 0. Let µi,θ,µj,θ be defined
as in the Wasserstein Mechanism. Let γ∗ = γ∗(µi,θ, µj,θ)
be the coupling between µi,θ and µj,θ that achieves the ∞-
Wasserstein distance.
Let M denote the Wasserstein mechanism. For any w, the
ratio P (M(X)=w|si,θ)
P (M(X)=w|sj ,θ) is:
=
∫
t
P (F (X) = t|si, θ)P (Z = w − t)dt∫
s
P (F (X) = s|sj , θ)P (Z = w − s)ds
=
∫
t
P (F (X) = t|si, θ)e−|w−t|/W dt∫
s
P (F (X) = s|sj , θ)e−|w−s|/W ds
=
∫
t
∫ t+W
s=t−W γ
∗(t, s)e−|w−t|/W dsdt∫
s
∫ s+W
t=s−W γ
∗(t, s)e−|w−s|/W dtds
, (9)
where the first step follows from the definition of the Wasser-
stein mechanism, the second step from properties of the
Laplace distribution, and the third step because for all W ≥
W∞(µi,θ, µj,θ), we have
µi,θ(t) = P (F (X) = t|si, θ) =
∫ t+W
s=t−W
γ∗(t, s)ds
An analogous statement also holds for µj,θ(s). Observe
that in the last step of (9), |s−t| ≤W in both the numerator
and denominator; therefore we have that the right hand side
of (9) is at most:
e
∫
t
∫ t+W
s=t−W γ
∗(t, s)e−|w−s|/W dsdt∫
s
∫ s+W
t=s−W γ
∗(t, s)e−|w−s|/W dtds
(10)
= e
∫
t
∫
s
γ∗(t, s)e−|w−s|/W dsdt∫
s
∫
t
γ∗(t, s)e−|w−s|/W dtds
≤ e, (11)
where the last step follows as γ∗(t, s) = 0 when |s− t| > W .
A similar argument shows that
P (M(X)=w|sj ,θ)
P (M(X)=w|si,θ) ≤ e
, thus
concluding the proof.
B.1 Comparison with Group DP
Consider a group-DP framework parameterized by a set
of groups G = (G1, . . . , Gk). For each k, we use XGk ⊂ X
to denote the records of all individuals in Gk, and we define
Dk = {(x, y)|x, y differ only by records in XGk}.
Definition B.1 (Global Sensitivity of Groups). We
define the global sensitivity of a query F with respect to a
group Gk as: ∆GkF = max(x,y)∈Dk |F (x) − F (y)|. The
Global Sensitivity of F with respect to an a Group DP frame-
work G is defined as: ∆GF = maxk∈{1,...,m}∆GkF.
Analogous to differential privacy, adding to the result of
query F Laplace noise with scale parameter ∆GF/ will pro-
vide in -group DP in the framework G [9].
We begin by formally defining a group DP framework cor-
responding to a given Pufferfish framework. Suppose we are
given a Pufferfish instantiation (S,Q,Θ) where data X can
be written as X = {X1, · · · , Xn}, Xi ∈ X , the secret set
S = {sia : a ∈ X , i ∈ {1, . . . , n}} where sia is the event that
Xi = a, and the set of secret pairs Q = {(sia, sib) : a, b ∈
X , a 6= b, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}}. In the corresponding Group DP
framework G, G1, . . . , Gm is a partition of {1, . . . , n}, such
that for any p 6= q, Xi and Xj are independent in all θ ∈ Θ
if i ∈ Gp, j ∈ Gq.
Proof. (Of Theorem 3.3) All we need to prove is W ≤
∆GF , where W is the noise parameter in the Wasserstein
Mechanism and ∆GF is the global sensitivity of F in the
group-DP framework G.
For any secret pair (sia, s
i
b) ∈ Q, let k be such that i ∈ Gk.
Let XT = X \ XGk . For all realizations xT of XT , define
νi,a,θ,xT = P (F (X)|Xi = a,XT = xT , θ) and νi,b,θ,xT =
P (F (XS , XT = xT )|Xi = b, θ).
Since any Xj ∈ XT is independent of Xi, for all real-
izations xT of XT , we have P (XT = xT |Xi = a, θ) =
P (XT = xT |Xi = b, θ) = P (XT = xT |θ). And we have
µi,a,θ =
∑
xT
P (XT = xT |θ)νi,a,θ,xT , and similarly, µi,b,θ =∑
xT
P (XT = xT |θ)νi,b,θ,xT . As these two probability dis-
tributions are mixtures of the νi,a,θ,xT s and νi,b,θ,xT s with
the same mixing coefficients, by Lemma B.2, we have:
W∞(µi,a,θ, µi,b,θ) ≤ maxxT W∞(νi,a,θ,xT , νi,b,θ,xT ).
By definition, ∞-Wasserstein of two distributions is up-
per bounded by the range of the union of the two supports,
W∞(νi,a,θ,xT , νi,b,θ,xT ) ≤ maxxGk ,x′Gk |F (XGk = xGk , XT =
xT ) − F (XGk = x′Gk , XT = xT )|, which is ≤ ∆GkF . Thus,
W∞(µi,a,θ, µi,b,θ) ≤ ∆GF. Since this holds for all (sia, sia) ∈
Q and all θ ∈ Θ, W ≤ ∆GF.
Lemma B.2. Let {µi}ni=1, {νi}ni=1 be two collections of
probability distributions, and let {ci}ni=1 be mixing weights
such that ci ≥ 0,∑i ci = 1. Let µ = ∑i ciµi and ν =∑
i ciνi be mixtures of the µi’s and νi’s with shared mixing
weights {ci}. Then W∞(µ, ν) ≤ maxi∈{1,...,n}W∞(µi, νi).
Proof. For all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, let γi be the coupling be-
tween µi and νi that achieves W∞(µi, νi). Let the support
of µ, ν be S, and that of µi, νi be Si. We can extend each
coupling γi to have value 0 at (x, y) ∈ S\Si.
We can construct a coupling γ between µ and ν as follows:
γ(x, y) =
∑n
i=1 ciγi(x, y). Since this is a valid coupling,
W∞(µ, ν) ≤ max(x,y)∈A |x − y| where A = {(x, y)|γ(x, y) 6=
0}. And we also know that max(x,y)∈A |x−y| = maxiW∞(µi, νi).
Therefore we haveW∞(µ, ν) ≤ maxi∈{1,...,n}W∞(µi, νi).
C. MARKOV QUILT MECHANISM
C.1 General Properties
Proof. (of Theorem 4.3) Consider any secret pair (sia, s
i
b) ∈
Q and any θ ∈ Θ. Let X∗Q,i (with X∗N,i, X∗R,i) be Markov
Quilt with minimum score for Xi. Since the trivial Markov
Quilt XQ = ∅ has eΘ(XQ|Xi) = 0 and σ(XQ) = n/, this
score is ≤ n/. Below we use the notation X∗Q, X∗N , X∗R to
denote X∗Q,i, X
∗
N,i, X
∗
R,i and use X
∗
Q ∪X∗R = X∗R∪Q.
For any w, we have P (F (X)+LσmaxZ=w|Xi=a,θ)
P (F (X)+LσmaxZ=w|Xi=b,θ) is at most:
max
x∗
R∪Q
P (F (X) + LσmaxZ = w|Xi = a,X∗R∪Q = x∗R∪Q, θ)
P (F (X) + LσmaxZ = w|Xi = b,X∗R∪Q = x∗R∪Q, θ)
P (X∗R∪Q = x
∗
R∪Q|Xi = a, θ)
P (X∗R∪Q = x
∗
R∪Q|Xi = b, θ)
. (12)
Since F is L-Lipschitz, for a fixed X∗R∪Q, F (X) can vary
by at most L · card(X∗N ); thus for x∗R∪Q, the first ratio in
(12) is ≤ e−eΘ(X∗Q|Xi).
Since X∗R is independent of Xi given X
∗
Q, the second ratio
in (12) is at most eeΘ(X
∗
Q|Xi). The theorem follows.
Proof. (of Theorem 4.4) Let Lk be the Lipschitz coeffi-
cient of Fk. Consider any secret pair (Xi = a,Xi = b) ∈ Q.
In a Pufferfish instantiation (S,Q,Θ), given  and SQ,i,
the active Markov Quilt X∗Q,i for Xi used by the Markov
Quilt Mechanism is fixed. Therefore all Mk use the same
active Markov Quilt, and we denote it by XQ, with corre-
sponding XR, XN . Let Zk ∼ Lap(σ(k)) denote the Laplace
noise added by the Markov Quilt Mechanism Mk to Fk(D).
For any k, since XQ is the active Markov Quilt, we have
σ(k) ≥ Lkcard(XN )
−eΘ(XQ|Xi) . Let XR∪Q = XR ∪XQ. Then for any
{wk}Kk=1, we have
P (∀k, Fk(X) + Zk = wk|Xi = a)
P (∀k, Fk(X) + Zk = wk|Xi = b)
=
∫
P (∀k, Fk(X) + Zk = wk, XR∪Q = xR∪Q|Xi = a)dxR∪Q∫
P (∀k, Fk(X) + Zk = wk, XR∪Q = xR∪Q|Xi = b)dxR∪Q
=
∫
P (∀k, Fk(X) + Zk = wk|XR∪Q = xR∪Q, Xi = a)∫
P (∀k, Fk(X) + Zk = wk|XR∪Q = xR∪Q, Xi = b)
P (XR∪Q = xR∪Q|Xi = a)dxR∪Q
P (XR∪Q = xR∪Q|Xi = b)dxR∪Q
≤ max
xR∪Q
P (∀k, Fk(X) + Zk = wk|XR∪Q = xR∪Q, Xi = a)
P (∀k, Fk(X) + Zk = wk|XR∪Q = xR∪Q, Xi = b)
P (XR∪Q = xR∪Q|Xi = a)
P (XR∪Q = xR∪Q|Xi = b) (13)
Let XN\{i} = XN\Xi. The first ratio in (13) equals to
=
∫
P (∀k, Fk(X) + Zk = wk, XN\{i} = xN\{i}∫
P (∀k, Fk(X) + Zk = wk, XN\{i} = xN\{i}
|XR∪Q = xR∪Q, Xi = a)dxN\{i}
|XR∪Q = xR∪Q, Xi = b)dxN\{i}
=
∫
P (∀k, Fk(X) + Zk = wk|XN\{i} = xN\{i}, XR∪Q = xR∪Q,∫
P (∀k, Fk(X) + Zk = wk|XN\{i} = xN\{i}, XR∪Q = xR∪Q,
Xi = a)P (xN\{i}|XR∪Q = xR∪Q, Xi = a)dxN\{i}
Xi = b)P (xN\{i}|XR∪Q = xR∪Q, Xi = b)dxN\{i} .
Let Fk(a, xN\{i}, xR∪Q) denote the value of Fk(X) withXi =
a, XR∪Q = xR∪Q and XN\{i} = xN\{i}. Since Fk(X)’s are
fixed given a fixed value of X, and Zk’s are independent, the
above equals to
=
∫
ΠkP (Zk = wk − Fk(a, xN\{i}, xR∪Q))∫
ΠkP (Zk = wk − Fk(b, xN\{i}, xR∪Q))
P (XN\{i} = xN\{i}|XR∪Q = xR∪Q, Xi = a)dxN\{i}
P (XN\{i} = xN\{i}|XR∪Q = xR∪Q, Xi = b)dxN\{i}
≤Πk maxxN\{i} P (Zk = wk − Fk(a, xN\{i}, xR∪Q))
Πk minxN\{i} P (Zk = wk − Fk(b, xN\{i}, xR∪Q))∫
P (XN\{i} = xN\{i}|XR∪Q = xR∪Q, Xi = a)dxN\{i}∫
P (XN\{i} = xN\{i}|XR∪Q = xR∪Q, Xi = b)dxN\{i}
Since P (XN\{i}|XR∪Q = xR∪Q, Xi = a), P (XN\{i}|XR∪Q =
xR∪Q, Xi = b) are probability distributions which integrate
to 1, the above equals to
Πk maxxN\{i} P (Zk = wk − Fk(a, xN\{i}, xR∪Q))
Πk minxN\{i} P (Zk = wk − Fk(b, xN\{i}, xR∪Q))
.
Notice that Fk can change by at most Lk · card(N) when
XN\{i} and Xi change. So for any xN\{i}, x
′
N\{i},
P (Zk = wk − Fk(a, xN\{i}, xR∪Q))
P (Zk = wk − Fk(b, x′N\{i}, xR∪Q))
≤ e−eΘ(XQ|Xi).
Therefore the first ratio in (13) is upper bounded by Πke
−eΘ(XQ|Xi).
As has been analyzed in the proof to Theorem 4.3, the sec-
ond ratio is bounded by eeΘ(XQ|Xi). Combining the two ra-
tios together, (13) is upper bounded by Πke
−eΘ(XQ|Xi)eeΘ(XQ|Xi) ≤
eK, and the theorem follows.
C.2 Markov Chains
Proof. (of Lemma 4.6) Consider a Markov Quilt (XN , XQ, XR)
of Xi. XQ = XQ,l∪XQ,r where all nodes in XQ,l have index
smaller than i, and all nodes in XQ,r have index larger than
i. When XQ is non-empty, there are three cases.
First, both XQ,l and XQ,r are non-empty. Then there ex-
ist positive integers a, b, such that Xi−a ∈ XQ,l is the node
with the largest index in XQ,l, and Xi+b is the node with
the smallest index in XQ,r. Since XQ,l\Xi−a is indepen-
dent of Xi given Xi−a, and XQ,r\Xi−b is independent of Xi
given Xi−b, eΘ(XQ|Xi) = eΘ({Xi−a, Xi+b}|Xi). Also, all
nodes in {Xi−a+1, . . . , Xi+b−1} should be included in XN ,
since they are not independent of Xi given XQ, and thus
card(XN ) ≥ a+ b− 1. Thus, if XQ′ = {Xi−a, Xi+b} ∈ SQ,i
with XN′ = {Xi−a+1, . . . , Xi+b−1}, then σ(XQ′) ≤ σ(XQ).
The second case is when XQ,r is empty but XQ,l is not.
Still, there exists positive integer a such that Xi−a ∈ XQ,l is
the node with largest index in XQ,l. Since XQ,l\Xi−a is in-
dependent of Xi given Xi−a, eΘ(XQ|Xi) = eΘ({Xi−a}|Xi).
Since all nodes in {Xi−a+1, . . . , XT } are not independent
of Xi given XQ, they should be included in XN , and thus
card(XN ) ≥ T − i+ a. Now consider XQ′ = {Xi−a} ∈ SQ,i
with XN′ = {Xi−a+1, . . . , XT }. The above implies that
σ(XQ′) ≤ σ(XQ). The third case is when XQ,l is empty
but XQ,r is not; this is analogous to the second case.
Before proving Lemma 4.8, we overload the notation gΘ
in (7) to capture the case where Θ consists of irreducible,
aperiodic and reversible Markov chains:
gΘ = (14){
2 minθ∈Θ min{1− |λ| : Pθx = λx, |λ| < 1}, θ ∈ Θ reversible
minθ∈Θ min{1− |λ| : PθP ∗θ x = λx, |λ| < 1}, otherwise.
Now we restate Lemma 4.8 to provide a better upper bound
when Pθ, ∀θ ∈ Θ is irreducible, aperiodic, and reversible.
Lemma C.1. Let piminΘ be as in (6), and gΘ be as in (14).
Suppose a, b are integers such that min(a, b) ≥ 2 log(1/piminΘ )
gΘ
.
Then, for XQ = {Xi−a, Xi+b}, eΘ(XQ|Xi) is at most:
log
(
piminΘ + exp(−gΘb/2)
piminΘ − exp(−gΘb/2)
)
+ 2 log
(
piminΘ + exp(−gΘa/2)
piminΘ − exp(−gΘa/2)
)
;
for XQ = {Xi−a}, eΘ(XQ|Xi) ≤ 2 log
(
piminΘ +exp(−gΘa/2)
piminΘ −exp(−gΘa/2)
)
;
for XQ = {Xi+b}, eΘ(XQ|Xi) ≤ log
(
piminΘ +exp(−gΘb/2)
piminΘ −exp(−gΘb/2)
)
,
and for XQ = ∅, eΘ(XQ|Xi) = 0.
The main ingredient in the proof of Lemma 4.8 is from
the following standard result in Markov Chain theory [1].
Lemma C.2. Consider an aperiodic, irreducible k-state
discrete time Markov Chain with transition matrix P . Let pi
be its stationary distribution and let pimin = minx pi(x). Let
P ∗ be the time-reversal of P , and let g be defined as follows:
g =
{
2 min{1− |λ| : Px = λx, |λ| < 1}, P is reversible
min{1− |λ| : PP ∗x = λx, |λ| < 1}, otherwise.
If ∆t =
exp(−tg/2)
pimin
, then
∣∣∣P t(x,y)pi(y) − 1∣∣∣ ≤ ∆t for t ≥ 2 log(1/pimin)g .
This lemma, along with some algebra and an Bayes Rule,
suffices to show the following.
Lemma C.3. For any Θ consists of irreducible and ape-
riodic Markov chains, let piminΘ be defined as in (6), and
gΘ be defined as in (14). Let ∆t =
exp(−tgΘ/2)
piminΘ
. Suppose
t >
2 log(1/piminΘ )
gΘ
. For any θ ∈ Θ and any x, x′ and y,
1−∆t
1 + ∆t
≤ P (Xt+j = y|Xj = x, θ)
P (Xt+j = y|Xj = x′, θ) ≤
1 + ∆t
1−∆t .(
1−∆t
1 + ∆t
)2
≤ P (Xj = y|Xj+t = x, θ)
P (Xj = y|Xj+t = x′, θ) ≤
(
1 + ∆t
1−∆t
)2
.
Proof. (of Lemma 4.8) ConsiderXQ of the form {Xi−a, Xi+b}.
For any θ, any x, x′ and any xQ, by conditional indepen-
dence, log
P (XQ=xQ|Xi=x,θ)
P (XQ=xQ|Xi=x′,θ) is equal to:
log
P (Xi+b = xi+b|Xi = x, θ)
P (Xi+b = xi+b|Xi = x′, θ) + log
P (Xi−a = xi−a|Xi = x, θ)
P (Xi−a = xi−a|Xi = x′, θ)
By Lemma C.3, this is at most 2 log 1+∆a
1−∆a +log
1+∆b
1−∆b for any
x, x′, xi−a, xi+b.
Moreover, when XQ = {Xi−a}, the first term disappears
and log
P (XQ=xQ|Xi=x,θ)
P (XQ=xQ|Xi=x′,θ) is at most 2 log
1+∆a
1−∆a ; the case
XQ = {Xi+b} is analogous, thus concluding the proof.
Proof. (of Theorem 4.10) Let a∗ be defined as in Lemma 4.9.
Consider the middle node XdT/2e and Markov Quilt XQ =
{XdT/2e−a∗ , XdT/2e+a∗}; since T ≥ 2a∗ + 1, both endpoints
of the quilt lie inside the chain. From Lemma 4.8 and the
definition of a∗, eΘ(XQ|Xi) ≤ /2.
Let C = 8dlog
(
exp(/6)+1
exp(/6)−1
1
piminΘ
)
/gΘe. We have σ(XQ) ≤
C

. By definition, σdT/2e ≤ σ(XQ). Also, by Lemma C.4,
σj ≤ σdT/2e for any j. Therefore maxj∈{1,...,T} σj ≤ C/.
C.3 Fast MQMApprox
Lemma C.4. In Algorithm MQMApprox, suppose there
exists an i ∈ {1, . . . , T}, such that σi = minXQ∈SQ,i σ(XQ)
is achieved by XQ = {Xi−a, Xi+b} with i−a ≥ 1, i+ b ≤ T .
Then, maxj∈{1,...,T} σj = σi.
Proof. (Of Lemma C.4) Let XQ = {xi−a, xi+b} be the
quilt with the lowest score for node Xi. Pick any other node
Xi′ . If both i
′ − a ≥ 1 and i′ + b ≤ T , then {Xi′−a, Xi′+b}
is a quilt for Xi′ with score σi. Since σi′ is the minimum
score over all quilts of Xi′ , σi′ ≤ σi.
Otherwise, at least one of the conditions i′ − a ≥ 1 or
i′ + b ≤ T hold. Suppose i′ − a ≥ 1. Then, consider the
quilt XQ′ = {Xi′−a} for Xi′ . Let XN (resp. XN′) be the
set of local nodes of Xi (resp. Xi′) corresponding to XQ
(resp. XQ′). Since i
′ + b ≥ T + 1, we have card(XN′) =
T − i′ + a ≤ a + b − 1 = card(XN ). This implies that
eΘ(XQ′ |Xi′) is equal to:
= 2 log
(
piminΘ + exp(−gΘa/2)
piminΘ − exp(−gΘa/2)
)
≤ log
(
piminΘ + exp(−gΘb/2)
piminΘ − exp(−gΘb/2)
)
+ 2 log
(
piminΘ + exp(−gΘa/2)
piminΘ − exp(−gΘa/2)
)
,
which is eΘ(XQ|Xi). This mean that σ(XQ′) = card(XN′ )−eΘ(XQ′ |Xi′ )
is at most card(XN )
−eΘ(XQ|Xi) = σi. Therefore, σi′ ≤ σi.
The other case where i′ + b ≤ T is analogous. Thus ∀i′,
σi′ ≤ σi and σmax = σi.
Proof. (Of Lemma 4.9) Consider the middle nodeXdT/2e
and Markov Quilt XQ = {XdT/2e−a∗ , XdT/2e+a∗}; since T ≥
8a∗, both endpoints of the quilt lie inside the chain. From
Lemma 4.8 and the definition of a∗, eΘ(XQ|Xi) ≤ /2.
Therefore, σ(XQ) =
2a∗−1
−eΘ(XQ|Xi) ≤
4a∗−2

.
Consider any Markov Quilt XQ′ (with corresponding XN′
and XR′) with card(XN′) ≥ 4a∗ − 2. Since max-influence
is always non-negative, we have σ(XQ′) =
card(XN′ )
−eΘ(XQ′ |Xi)
≥
4a∗−2

≥ σ(XQ), and thus any Markov Quilt XQ′ with
card(XN′) ≥ 4a∗ − 2 has score no less than that of XQ =
{Xi−a∗ , Xi+a∗}. If XQ′ is of the form {Xi−a′} or {Xi+b′},
then since T ≥ 8a∗, we have card(XN′) ≥ 4a∗. Therefore
the optimal Markov Quilt for Xi is of the form {Xi−a, Xi+b}
with a+b ≤ 4a∗. Combining this with Lemma C.4 concludes
the proof.
C.4 MQMExact Optimization
We show that MQMExact can be expedited further if Θ
is of the form: Θ = ∆k × P, where P is a set of transition
matrices, and ∆k is the probability simplex over k items. In
other words, Θ includes tuples of the form (q, P ) where q
ranges over possible initial distributions and P belongs to a
set P of transition matrices.
For any P ∈ P, let ΘP = {(P, q) ∈ Θ}. Let P j be P
raised to the j-th power. From (5), eΘP (XQ|Xi) is equal to:
max
x,x′∈X
(
log max
q
(q>P i−1)(x′)
(q>P i−1)(x)
+ max
xi+b∈X
log
P b(x, xi+b)
P b(x′, xi+b)
+ max
xi−a∈X
log
P a(xi−a, x)
P a(xi−a, x′)
)
.
Since (q>P i−1)(x) = q>P i−1(:, x), for i > 1, we have
max
q
(q>P i−1)(x′)
(q>P i−1)(x)
= max
q
q>P i−1(:, x′)
q>P i−1(:, x)
= max
y
P i−1(y, x′)
P i−1(y, x)
where the the maximum is achieved by q = ey∗ , y
∗ =
arg maxy
P i−1(y,x′)
P i−1(y,x) .
This implies that we only need to iterate over all transition
matrices P instead of conducting a grid search over Θ, which
further improves efficiency.
